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GOVERNING INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE SHARING BEHAVIOR 
 
Abstract 
The emerging Knowledge Governance Approach asserts the need to build micro-
foundations grounded in individual action. Toward this goal, using the Theory of Planned 
Behavior, we aim to explain individual knowledge sharing behavior as being determined 
by the intention to share knowledge and its antecedents: attitude toward knowledge 
sharing, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. In addition, we consider 
managerial interventions (governance mechanisms) that managers can employ to 
influence the identified antecedents and thereby govern individual knowledge sharing 
behavior.  We test the model arrived at on a dataset collected among individuals engaged 
in knowledge sharing in two competing firms. Results of the LISREL analysis show that 
the use of rewards affects attitudes toward knowledge sharing negatively, while the use of 
reciprocal schemes and communication mechanisms have a positive effect on subjective 
norms and perceived behavioral control, respectively.  
Keywords: knowledge governance, knowledge sharing, theory of planned behavior 
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INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the governance of knowledge processes has been consistently 
emphasized in the literature (e.g., Grandori and Kogut, 2002; Foss, 2007) as without such 
governance this invaluable resource may remain undiscovered, underleveraged, and 
trapped in individual minds. Hence, governance mechanisms that may enhance 
knowledge processes have increasingly become the focus of investigations by 
knowledge-based scholars (e.g., Minbaeva et al., 2003; Janssen et al., 2006; Kang et al., 
2007). However, despite an increasing interest in the subject, it is surprising how little 
empirical research provides an understanding (beyond correlation) of the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and knowledge processes.  
Toward this goal, one significant theoretical development is the emerging Knowledge 
Governance Approach (KGA) (Grandori, 2001; Foss, 2007). It focuses on the interplay 
between knowledge-based contingency factors and organizational routines such as 
reward systems, coordination mechanisms, and standard operating procedures. To 
identify the mechanisms, KGA asserts the need to build micro-foundations grounded in 
individual action and interaction for organizational knowledge-based phenomena (Felin 
and Foss, 2005). As Foss (2007) explains, governance mechanisms are deployed in the 
belief that influencing the conditions of individual actions in a certain manner will lead 
employees to take those decisions that, when aggregated, lead to favorable organizational 
outcomes.  
The current theoretical challenge lies in unfolding the general concept of micro-
foundation by identifying those conditions of individual actions that influence behavior 
(Foss, 2007). Yet, just highlighting the conditions of individual action is of little help to 
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managers. Hence, we need to consider managerial interventions (governance 
mechanisms) which managers can employ to influence the conditions of individual 
actions and thereby facilitate individual knowledge sharing behavior.     
In this study, we integrate the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) with the KGA as one 
potential avenue for creating a greater understanding of the micro-foundation of the 
knowledge process in firms. The TPB is a general theory developed in psychology that 
identifies the antecedents of human behavior such as why a person buys a new computer, 
votes against a certain candidate, performs miserably during an exam, etc. The TPB is an 
individual-level theory, and has received a great deal of attention in social cognition 
models as it identifies the antecedents of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control  - corresponding beliefs reflecting the underlying cognitive structure, 
and it specifies the role of behavioral interventions (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage and Conner, 
2001). Extending the work on TPB into the knowledge domain allows us to go a step 
further and consider how the antecedents of individual behavior may be influenced by 
managerial interventions (governance mechanisms).  
In sum, we intend to make two contributions as we (1) endogenously explain the 
knowledge sharing behavior of individuals as determined by the intention to share 
knowledge and its antecedents: attitudes toward knowledge sharing, subjective norms, 
and perceived control; and (2) suggest governance mechanisms (like rewards, reciprocal 
schemes, and communication mechanisms) that influence the identified antecedents. 
Further, in response to the recent calls for focus on the role that individuals play in 
leveraging knowledge (Felin and Hesterly, 2007), we use data collected at the individual 
(micro) level. Regrettably, previous studies have mainly focused on a more aggregate 
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level (i.e. organizational units) and often limited validity of the data by the use of only 
one or few respondents per organization – usually a CEO and/or general managers.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. Building upon the insights 
of the TPB, we first suggest how behavioral antecedents affect individuals’ knowledge 
sharing behavior. Subsequently, we seek to identify knowledge governance mechanisms 
that influence the antecedents identified. The empirical testing of the proposed model is 
based on data collected among individuals engaged in knowledge sharing in two Danish 
firms, Danisco and Chr.Hansen, which compete head to head in the global market for 
food ingredients, where they are both dominant players. Finally, we discuss our findings 
and their implications in terms of both theory and practice. 
 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS 
The knowledge-based view (KBV) considers a firm to be “a knowledge-integrating 
institution” (Grant, 1996: 111) and “a social community specializing in the speed and 
transfer of knowledge” (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 503). It puts emphasis on social 
interactions as efficient means for intra-organizational knowledge exchange. Such a view 
is in line with research on intra-organizational knowledge sharing, which considers 
knowledge sharing to be a relational concept that depends on an individual’s willingness 
to share knowledge. The challenge for organizations is thus to promote individual 
knowledge sharing behavior through the effective use of organizational mechanisms and 
to provide organizational members with the opportunity to interact with colleagues within 
and across departments, functions and business units (Pan and Scarbrough, 1998).  
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However, the KBV was criticized for using only variables defined at the organizational 
level (such as culture, community, routine, and environment) as explanans for outcomes 
or as the antecedents to new value (Felin and Hesterly, 2007). It was argued that since 
individuals are “the primary actors in knowledge creation and the principle repository of 
knowledge” (Grant, 1996: 121), knowledge-based scholars should “carefully revisit their 
underlying philosophical and theoretical assumptions about the primacy given to 
collectives and to consider potential individual-level explanations as antecedents to new 
value creation” (Felin and Hesterly, 2007: 214). Hence to push further the empirical 
research on knowledge sharing, we need to integrate some individual-level theories – 
those considering individuals and their actions as the basic units of analysis (Elster, 
1989).  
To date, many studies on knowledge sharing which do consider individual-level theories 
have utilized the insights from motivational theories. In particular, Minbaeva et al. (2003) 
utilized the insights from the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory to argue that both individual 
ability and motivation to absorb knowledge are needed to achieve a higher degree of 
knowledge transfer. Deci’s Intrinsic Motivation Theory arguments were used by several 
scholars who argue that especially intrinsic motivation has a positive effect on knowledge 
sharing (Cabrera, Collins and Salgado, 2006; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Notwithstanding 
the contribution made by these studies, their results – especially those with managerial 
implications - are difficult to integrate. This may be explained by the fact that the above-
mentioned theories pertain to “different elements of the motivation sequence and 
therefore are designed to explain different things” (Locke, 1991: 295). To advance our 
understanding of what drives individual behavior and how it can be governed Locke 
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(1991) suggests that future studies need to move further along the “Motivation Sequence” 
(see Figure 1). In the figure, Locke (1991) identifies “key motivational concepts in 
chronological sequence” (from “Needs” to “Satisfaction”) and shows “where in the 
sequence each major theory of motivation is focused” (p. 288). He argues that 
organizational intervention via governance mechanisms at the “Need” stage is impossible 
because needs are innate. Intervening at the later stage of “Value” is difficult in that “it 
would require either some form of therapy or very intense, structured experiences which 
would be of questionable ethical status” (Locke, 1991: 296).  Instead, Locke advises 
considering theories constituting the “Motivational Hub”, “where the action is” (Locke, 
1991: 296; original italics). One of the theories outlined by Locke as the Motivational 
Hub theory is the Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior. In the next section, we describe 
the theory and, drawing on it, put forward hypotheses on how knowledge sharing 
behavior of individuals could be governed via organizational mechanisms.  
-INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUALS: THE APPLICATION 
OF THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR  
The TPB is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) introduced by Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975). According to the TRA, the proximal determinant of whether or not a 
person behaves in a certain way is her intentions to do so, which in turn are determined 
by two constructs: attitude and subjective norm. Although meta-analytic reviews 
supported the predictive validity of the TRA (e.g. Sheppard et al., 1988), it was 
concluded that the TRA only predicts voluntary behaviors or behaviors over which the 
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individual has a good deal of control (Sheeran et al., 2003: 394). To address this issue, 
Ajzen (1985, 1991) extended the TRA by including another construct: perceived 
behavioral control, and specifying behavioral interventions designed to change the 
behavior in question. The rationale behind adding the perceived behavioral control was 
that “it would allow prediction of behaviors that were not under complete volitional 
control”. It could provide “information about the potential constraints on action as 
perceived by the actor” and it might help to “explain why intentions do not always 
predict behavior” (Armitage and Conner, 2001: 472). The extended version was referred 
to as the “Theory of Planned Behavior”.   
The TPB posits that (behavioral) intentions are the main determinants of behavior. The 
strength of an intention is indicated by the person’s subjective probability that she will 
perform the behavior in question. The TPB defines intentions as being determined by 
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. Attitude 
is defined as “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or 
unfavorable manner with respect to a given object” (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975: 6).  It is 
recommended to use the term “attitude toward a behavior” since it reflects a person’s 
evaluation that performing the behavior is good or bad, that she is in favor of or against 
performing the behavior. The subjective norm reflects the person’s perception that others 
desire “the performance or non-performance of a specific behavior” (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980: 57), i.e. they are in favor of or opposition to her performance of the behavior. 
Sometimes these two components of intention may be in disagreement. A person may 
hold a favorable attitude toward a certain behavior, but will not engage in the behavior 
since important others believe that s/he should not perform it. Perceived behavioral 
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control is defined as the person’s perceptions of her ability to perform a given behavior 
and likelihood of being successful at doing so (Ajzen, 1991). Intention to behave will also 
depend upon the level of perceived behavioral control because “a person is unlikely to 
intend to perform a behavior that is outside her control” (Sheeran et al., 2002: 394). In 
sum, “the more favorable the attitude and subjective norm with respect to a behavior, and 
the greater the perceived behavioral control, the stronger should be an individual’s 
intention to perform the behavior under consideration” (Ajzen, 1991: 188) 
As argued earlier, the TPB has been a useful tool to predict a wide range of behaviors. 
Applying the TPB to understand knowledge sharing behavior, we define the behavioral 
components in the following way. By behavior, we mean the actual knowledge sharing 
behavior of an individual, which is manifested in the extent to which the individual in 
question receives and utilizes knowledge from colleagues. According to the TPB, 
intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence behavior: “they 
are indications of how hard people are willing to try or how much of an effort they are 
planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991: 181). In our case, the 
likelihood that an individual will engage in knowledge sharing may be termed as her 
intention to share knowledge. The TPB argues that under well-controlled conditions, 
intentions can predict overt behavior (discussion and empirical evidence in Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1970; Ajzen 1971; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973). Recent literature on knowledge 
sharing also argues that behavioral intentions could be considered as pre-requisites for the 
knowledge sharing behavior of individuals (Lin and Lee, 2004; Bock et al., 2005). 
Indeed, since much human behavior in general and knowledge sharing behavior in 
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particular are under volitional control, the best predictor of an individual’s behavior will 
be her intention to perform that behavior. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1. Strong intention to engage in knowledge sharing behavior positively 
influences the extent of knowledge sharing behavior.   
According to the TPB, there are three conceptually independent determinants of 
intention: attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control. The attitude toward knowledge sharing refers to the individual’s judgment that 
conducting the knowledge sharing is good or bad; that she is in favor of or against 
knowledge sharing (Bock et al., 2005). In other words, a person holding a favorable 
attitude toward knowledge sharing would be expected to have a higher behavioral 
intention to share knowledge (Lin and Lee, 2004). Bock et al’s (2005) similar proposition 
received full support in their empirical testing. Accordingly we expect,  
Hypothesis 2. A positive attitude toward knowledge sharing positively influences the 
individual’s intention to share knowledge.  
Subjective norm is defined as “a specific behavioral prescription attributed to a 
generalized social agent” (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 57). Norms are typically defined as 
patterns of behavior that become accepted as ways that people ought to behave. They are 
prescriptive but lack the formal status of rules. Subjective norms, however, refer to the 
person’s perception of others’ thinking regarding the behavior in question. In forming a 
subjective norm about knowledge sharing, a person takes into account the normative 
expectations of various others in her working environment. In other words, she considers 
whether specific groups or the whole organization agree that knowledge sharing behavior 
is desired and valued (Lin and Lee, 2004). Bock et al. (2005) found full support for their 
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hypothesis stipulating that the greater the subjective norm to share knowledge is, the 
greater the intention to share knowledge will be. Thus,  
Hypothesis 3. Strong subjective norms about knowledge sharing positively influence 
the individual’s intention to share knowledge.  
The third antecedent of intention is the degree of perceived behavioral control.  “In 
general, individuals are more disposed (i.e. intend) to engage in behaviors that are 
believed to be achievable” (Armitage and Conner, 2001: 472). ”Translating” the TPB 
logic for knowledge sharing would imply the following: an individual will most likely 
engage in knowledge sharing when she holds a positive attitude toward knowledge 
sharing, when knowledge sharing is a social norm, and when that individual perceives 
knowledge sharing as being more easy than difficult. In the knowledge sharing literature, 
it has also been pointed out numerous times that an individual’s perception of the 
potential constraints on her action will decrease the extent to which she is willing to 
engage in knowledge sharing (e.g. Husted and Michailova, 2002).  
Thus,  
Hypothesis 4. Perceived behavioral control positively influences the individual’s 
intention to share knowledge 
The hypotheses are summarized in the theoretical model presented in Figure 2.  
-INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
12 
 
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
Earlier, we argued that attention should be given to governance mechanisms that 
managers can employ to affect individuals’ knowledge sharing behavior. As Foss (2007) 
explains, governance mechanisms are deployed in the belief that influencing the 
conditions of individual actions in a certain manner will lead employees to make those 
decisions that, when aggregated, lead to favorable organizational outcomes. We subscribe 
to this argument and consequently propose a number of knowledge governance 
mechanisms that can be applied to influence the previously identified antecedents of 
behavioral intentions (attitude, subjective norms, and perceived control) and thereby 
affect the knowledge sharing behavior of individuals.  
When discussing behavioral interventions, Ajzen (1991) argues that “it is at the level of 
beliefs that we can learn about the unique factors that induce one person to engage in the 
behavior of interest” (pp. 206-207). Hence, managerial interventions (in our case, 
governance mechanisms) should be designed around the “salient beliefs that are 
considered to be the prevailing determinants of a person’s intentions and actions” (p. 189; 
original italics).  Ajzen distinguishes between three beliefs: (1) “behavioral beliefs, which 
are assumed to influence attitudes toward the behavior”; (2) “normative beliefs, which 
constitute the underlying determinants of subjective norms”, and (3) “control beliefs, 
which provide the basis for perceptions of behavioral control” (Ajzen, 1991: 189, original 
italics). In particular,  
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• behavioral beliefs link the behavior to a certain outcome, or “to some other 
attribute such as the cost incurred by performing the behavior”(Ajzen, 1991: 191); 
• normative beliefs are concerned with the likelihood that important referent 
individuals or groups approve or disapprove of performing a given behavior;  
• control beliefs are about the presence of resources and opportunities that may 
facilitate or impede the performance of the behavior: “the fewer obstacles or 
impediments they [individuals] anticipate, the greater should be their perceived 
control over the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991: 196). 
Ajzen further emphasizes that because attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control are based on corresponding sets of beliefs, behavioral interventions 
(governance mechanisms) must try to attack the strength of the corresponding beliefs, 
which ultimately will guide the performance of the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
Consequently, we propose three types of governance mechanisms associated with 
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs and label them respectively as external 
rewards, reciprocal schemes, and communication mechanisms.   
External rewards 
Rewards represent an almost universal form of inducement for individuals to perform. 
While from an expectancy theory point of view it is the existence of a clear linkage 
between individual effort and reward that matters, from an equity theory (and 
organizational justice) perspective, the main question is whether employees perceive that 
they receive the rewards they are entitled to on the basis of their contribution to the 
organization. Both perspectives would lead us to expect a positive relationship between 
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rewards for certain behavior and individual attitudes toward this behavior. In the 
literature on knowledge sharing, rewards are posited to encourage more positive attitudes 
toward knowledge sharing (Bock et al., 2005). One of the well-known examples is 
Siemens ShareNet, which measured and rewarded employees for knowledge sharing. 
When ShareNet was in its infancy, the reward system was designed to create a critical 
mass of content by making users aware of the system and encouraging contributions. 
Therefore we propose,  
Hypothesis 5. The more individuals are externally rewarded for knowledge sharing, 
the more positive their attitude toward knowledge sharing is. 
Reciprocal schemes  
These governance mechanisms are related to a person’s beliefs that “certain referents 
think the person should or should not perform the behavior in question” (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975: 16). These beliefs associate a behavior with certain outcomes: significant 
others’ approval and disapproval. The stronger the normative belief, the greater the 
motivation to comply with those referents.  
Subjective norms are strengthened when employees get positive feedback on past 
instances of knowledge sharing, for example, acknowledgement for their contribution to 
others’ work and/or organizational development. The main potential benefits of feedback 
for the focal individual are: “(a) more accurate signals with regard to goal prioritization; 
(b) reduced uncertainty with regard to issues surrounding goal attainment; and (c) a better 
basis for improving his/her own competence” (Barner-Rasmussen, 2003: 42). Bock et al. 
(2005) found that the anticipated reciprocal relationships are conducive to knowledge 
sharing. Thus,  
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Hypothesis 6. The more individuals are reciprocally rewarded for knowledge 
sharing, the more positive their subjective norm regarding knowledge sharing is. 
Communication mechanisms 
According to the TPB, control beliefs, which are antecedents of perceived behavior 
control, are “concerned with the perceived power of specific factors to facilitate or inhibit 
performance of the behavior” (Armitage and Conner, 2001: 474). Governance 
mechanisms, which could be employed to affect the control beliefs of the individuals, 
should increase the perceived presence of “adequate resources and opportunities” that 
may facilitate the performance of the behavior and increase its “frequency of occurring” 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001: 474-475).   
The importance of the presence and use of communication mechanisms has been 
emphasized numerous times in the literature on knowledge sharing and transfer. 
Szulanski (1996) claims that knowledge sharing requires numerous individual exchanges, 
especially when the knowledge shared has a tacit component. Hansen (1999) concludes 
that a lack of direct relations and extensive communication between employees from 
different departments inhibits knowledge flows while strong inter-unit relations facilitate 
them. Bresman et al. (1999) showed that interpersonal communication, such as visits and 
meetings, were significant facilitators of international knowledge sharing. Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) considered not only the existence of communication channels but 
also the richness of communication links, captured as informality, openness, and density 
of communication. The results provided strong support for the prediction that the 
existence and richness of lateral interunit integration mechanisms (channels linking a 
focal subsidiary to the rest of MNC) are positively associated with knowledge sharing.  
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We would like to emphasize that it is not just the existence of various opportunities to 
interact, but rather the individuals’ use of these opportunities that matters for knowledge 
sharing (Hansen, 2002). Accordingly, we expect that the more an individual makes use of 
the various opportunities available, the fewer anticipated obstacles and impediments to 
the performance of the behavior she perceives and hence the stronger her perceived 
behavioral control is.   
Hypothesis 7. The more individuals use communication mechanisms, the stronger 
their perceived behavioral control is.  
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
All data used in the analysis were from the MANDI (Managing the Dynamic Interfaces 
between Culture and Knowledge) questionnaire on knowledge sharing among 
individuals. The questionnaire focuses mainly on the nature of knowledge sharing, 
governance mechanisms, and individual perceptions of enablers and barriers to 
knowledge sharing. It was developed as a result of a focused literature review and a 
cross-case analysis of in-depth case studies conducted in eight firms. Further, the 
questionnaire was pre-tested with each company participant to increase the clarity of the 
questions and avoid interpretation errors. The questions were translated and back-
translated, thereby reducing the risk of comprehension problems. The questionnaire was 
available in a number of different languages, in both an electronic (internet-based) and 
paper-based version. 
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The questionnaire consisted of 27 questions, most of which applied a fixed-response 
Likert-type scale. Despite the obvious limitations of perceptual and self-reported 
measures, they constitute the most suitable methodology for the study of individual 
human behavior and, when employed through a rigorous research design, may even be 
superior to other approaches (Howard, 1994; Spector 1994).  
We concur with Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) who advocated one-site sampling to ensure that 
“a number of broad contextual factors that are known to influence the innovative ability 
of organizations” are controlled for in the research design (p. 468). The aim of the survey 
was to apply the same questionnaire in a few firms and involve as many employees of the 
firms as possible. This is a major advantage compared to questionnaires that are designed 
to target a large number of firms, but only one or a few respondents per organization.  
The link to the (internet-based) survey was distributed via the respective firm’s internal e-
mail system. Thus, the collection of the questionnaires was mediated by a representative 
from each of the respective firms, who acted as the contact person. To reduce possible 
social desirability bias, we followed Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) and explained in the 
opening paragraph that the survey software prevents any identification of individuals, and 
data  are collected using an external server, and that our analysis would be restricted to an 
aggregate level.  
The survey was applied in two Danish firms: Chr.Hansen and Danisco. Both are leading 
suppliers of ingredients for food and other consumer products. The knowledge shared in 
these two firms has the advantage of being codifiable, as it involves a large element of 
chemistry, which can be codified in formulas etc. This implies that individual drivers of 
knowledge sharing behavior are particularly important in these firms (rather than the 
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characteristics of the knowledge), which makes these firms excellent for testing the 
model of knowledge sharing behavior. Secondary data, which were collected 
independently of the administered survey, were used to present the case companies (see 
below) and make the research findings more robust.  
Danisco develops and produces food ingredients, sweeteners, and sugar for the food and 
beverage industry, and animal feed ingredients for the agriculture industry. In the 
financial year 2006/07, Danisco had approximately 10,423 employees, net sales of DKK 
20.4 billion, and EBITA of DKK 2.2 billion.  
Danisco’s focus on knowledge, innovation, and know-how is supported by its slogan 
“First you add knowledge…” One of Danisco’s objectives is to acquire knowledge and 
thus create value and growth: in the financial year 2006/07, Danisco spent DKK 874 
million on innovation, representing 4.3 percent of sales.  
With its ‘One-Stop-Supplier’ strategy, Danisco provides holistic, all-product solutions to 
customers. This means that the sales organization is required to work closely together 
with the research and development departments in all nine product divisions as well as 
the different production sites. The complexity of this strategy thus puts great demands on 
knowledge sharing across divisions and departments. The administration of knowledge 
management in Danisco is located in ‘Global Innovation’, Danisco’s research and 
development organization, and contrary to, for example, consulting firms, enterprise 
critical knowledge in Danisco relates to specific products and processes.  
Danisco’s knowledge and innovation focus is further supported by its espousement of 
five values: “We create value”, “We are innovative”, “We build competencies”, “We take 
responsibility”, and “We believe in dialogue”. What is relevant with regard to knowledge 
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sharing is that the company claims that it is open-minded about new ideas and new ways 
of doing things. Additionally, it focuses on continuous learning and dialogue in an 
organization without boundaries.  
Chr.Hansen is an international supplier of natural ingredient solutions for the food, 
pharmaceutical, nutritional, and agricultural industries. It is globally present with 
production facilities on three continents, employing 2,498 employees in 29 countries. 
Development centers are situated in Denmark, the US, France, and Germany, and 
application centers are found in 21 countries. In the financial year 2005/06, Chr.Hansen 
achieved revenues of DKK 3.767 million and EBITA of DKK 308 million. 
The strong commitment and ongoing efforts in innovation and development have in the 
case of Chr.Hansen resulted in the adoption of the corporate slogan “130 years of 
innovation”. Chr.Hansen has some institutionalized practices for knowledge sharing. It is 
reported that project kick-offs and information meetings are held and that such initiatives 
to some extent promote knowledge sharing by informing co-workers about current 
projects. International seminars, cross-cultural management groups, and expatriation are 
further initiatives implemented in order to overcome the challenge of geographical 
distance and thereby increase opportunities for knowledge sharing. When it comes to the 
sharing of explicit knowledge, the company has databases capturing and reporting 
various projects, recipes, and techniques. However, these databases are somewhat 
restricted for outsiders as a great deal of the knowledge processes that take place at 
Chr.Hansen are classified as confidential.  
Survey. In order to gain access to the survey participants in Danisco, local HR managers 
at fourteen different food ingredient production sites, located in eleven different 
20 
countries, were contacted by e-mail from corporate HR and asked to nominate 
approximately 20 employees each to participate in the survey. All in all, 281 invitations 
to participate in the survey were sent out. In the Americas, three sites in the USA and one 
site in Mexico were contacted. In Europe, two sites in Denmark and one site each in the 
UK, Belgium, Finland, and Germany were contacted. In the Asia-Pacific region, one site 
each in China, Malaysia, and Australia/New Zealand was contacted. 221 questionnaires 
were filled in and 219 questionnaires were usable for the analysis. This equals a total 
response rate of 78 percent. The German subsidiary, by appeal from its works council, 
was not permitted to participate in the survey because it was not available in the local 
language – German. The higher number of responses in Denmark and the US (48 
respondents each) is attributed to the fact that in Denmark, two Danisco sites participated, 
and in the US, three Danisco sites participated in the survey.  
The data collection at Chr.Hansen was initiated by a manager of the knowledge 
management project group. The invitations were distributed internally within functional 
areas such as R&D, production, marketing, and sales. More specifically, the 
questionnaire was distributed among 350 Chr.Hansen employees in Denmark, France, 
and the US. The reason for choosing these three specific countries lies in the fact that 
they all have organized R&D activities. 251 responses were returned, giving a response 
rate of approximately 72%. Approximately half of the respondents come from Denmark 
(153 responses), 59 from the USA, and 26 from France.   
The respondents are described in Table 1.  After consultation with each company’s 
representative, the distribution of the survey responses was regarded as representative. 
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
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With respect to possible common method bias, the performance variables were placed 
after the independent variables in the survey in order to diminish, if not avoid, the effects 
of consistency artifacts (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Salancik and Pfeffer,  1977). 
Moreover, as a post hoc analysis of the potential common method bias, we carried out a 
Harman one-factor test. The test assumes that if a large amount of common method bias 
is present, the test will result in either a single factor or a “general” factor that accounts 
for a very high level of the covariance in the variables in the model. Our sample does not 
seem to have this potential hazard since when including all eighteen items (manifest 
variables) we obtained seven factors with eigenvalues above 1 and the two first factors 
only explained 22% and 14% of the variance, respectively.  
 
MEASURES 
We used perceptual measures for operationalization of all variables in this study. 
Perceptual measures are recommended for studies of human behavior in general (Spector, 
1994, Howard, 1994) and are widely used in studies on knowledge sharing. Further, 
using perceptual measures of individuals allowed us to capture the actual implemented 
management mechanisms or practices in use, instead of intended practices designed on a 
strategic level (Wright and Nishii, 2005).  
Knowledge sharing behavior refers to individuals’ observable actions in terms of 
knowledge sharing. When aggregated, individuals’ knowledge sharing behaviors result in 
a higher degree of knowledge transfer within the organization. Hence, we adopted a 
measure for knowledge transfer from Minbaeva et al. (2003), but modified for the 
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individual level, which captures the acts of the individuals. We asked individual 
respondents to indicate the extent to which they gained and used knowledge from 
colleagues in their departments.  
Intention to share knowledge is a measure of individual’s readiness to perform a given 
behavior. “If one wants to know whether or not an individual will perform a given 
behavior, the simplest and probably most efficient thing that one can do is to ask the 
individual whether he intends to perform that behavior” (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975: 369). 
We tried to capture participants’ intentions by asking respondents to indicate the extent to 
which they agree with the following statements: “Increased value for my department is 
enough to motivate knowledge sharing” and “Increased value for me is enough to 
motivate knowledge sharing.”  
Attitude toward knowledge sharing is defined as the degree to which one’s feelings 
about sharing one’s knowledge are positive (Bock et al. 2005). In other words, it is the 
degree to which knowledge sharing behavior is positively or negatively valued. 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), standard attitude-scaling methods take an 
indirect approach by attempting to infer the person’s location on the evaluative dimension 
on the basis of the person’s responses to a set of opinion items. Following the same logic, 
respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with two items capturing 
attitude toward knowledge sharing (adopted from Husted and Michailova (2002): “It is 
important to keep one’s ideas secret until one can be recognized as the source of the idea” 
and “The knowledge one shares reduces the incentives for other people to do the work 
themselves.”  
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Subjective norm is an expression of the individual’s perception of social normative 
pressures. It is expected that “organization members who share a vision will be more 
likely to become partners sharing or exchanging their resources” (Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998: 467). We asked respondents to indicate to what extent they agree with the 
following two statements: “Knowledge sharing is valued in my company” and 
“Knowledge sharing is valued in my department.”  
Perceived control refers to an individual’s perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
knowledge sharing behavior. It is about perceived power of specific factors to facilitate or 
inhibit performance of the behavior. As indicated above, individual perception of how 
acceptable mistakes are in the organization could influence individuals’ willingness to 
share knowledge (Husted and Michailova, 2002). Accordingly, respondents were asked 
to reflect on the following two questions: “I feel I have the right to make mistakes when I 
do my job” and “I do not have difficulties telling others about my own mistakes.”  
External rewards is a measure of the extent to which an individual perceives that 
external rewards are used for promotion of knowledge transfer. Two items were used to 
capture the use of this governance mechanism: the respondents were asked to evaluate 
the extent to which they are currently rewarded for transferring knowledge by 
“increments/bonuses” and “by promotion.”  
Reciprocal schemes. We asked the respondents to evaluate the extent to which they are 
“rewarded” for transferring knowledge by the following mechanisms associated with 
reciprocity: “acknowledgement of my contribution”, “a better reputation”, ”respect as an 
expert”, and “professional and personal development.”  
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Communication mechanisms. The extent to which communication is used to facilitate 
knowledge sharing was measured by three items (adopted from Bresman et al., 1999). 
The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they use: 1) face-to-face 
communication, 2) meetings, and 3) informal communication (coffee breaks, social 
events, etc.) in sharing knowledge.  
The exact wording and scales of the survey questions are listed in Table 2. 
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
Validity of the model 
The hypotheses are tested in a LISREL model, which allows for simultaneous formation 
of underlying constructs (the measurement model) and testing of structural relationships 
among these constructs (the structural model).  
First, a measurement model is created in order to assess the convergent and discriminant 
validity of our constructs. To ascertain whether the constructs are internally coherent, we 
report several tests of convergent validity in Table 2 that are based on the saturated 
measurement model, where all interfactor correlations are specified (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
1993). First, the strength of the linearity in relations between constructs and items – the 
R-squared values – is shown in Table 2. In all cases, the strength of the linearity is 
relatively strong with an R-squared value of 0.42 or above, which is clearly above the 
usual threshold of 0.20 for the R-squared value (Hair et al., 1995). From Table 2 we can 
also conclude that the (standardized) factor loadings are strong (all above 0.65). Second, 
the reliability of each construct is calculated and all of them are above the recommended 
threshold. Also, in regard to the variance extracted, the overall model is clearly very 
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robust as all constructs are above the recommended threshold of 0.50. All in all, the 
measurement model and the presented measures provide strong support for the 
convergent as well as the discriminant validity of our constructs. 
The purpose of the LISREL analysis is to arrive at and confirm a model consisting of 
specified causal relations. Thus, in the test, we generate a structural model that contains 
significant relationships in accordance with the stipulated hypotheses. We test single 
causal relations with t-values and factor loadings between the constructs in the model. 
Goodness-of-fit indexes are critical for the evaluation of the entire model. However, 
given their complexity, there is no consensus regarding the “best” index of overall fit for 
structural equations. Thus, reporting multiple indexes is encouraged (Bollen, 1989). 
Goodness-of-fit. We assess the entire model by different goodness-of-fit measures 
including the chi-square value, and the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), which measures the 
distance between the data and the model, i.e., nomological validity (Joreskog and 
Sorbom, 1993). The model presented has a Chi-square value of χ2[127] = 311.5 (p = 
0.01), while the GFI based on residuals has a value of 0.93, representing a good fit of the 
model to the data (Bollen , 1989) . Finally, the Bentler-Bonett NNFI represents the 
proportion of improvement in fit relative to the null model, while controlling for model 
parsimony. The obtained value (NNFI=0.91) represents a good fit of the model to the 
data. In addition, the RMSEA is only 0.06 and therefore below the suggested threshold of 
0.08. Thus, the conclusion based on the three measures of GFI, NNFI and RMSEA is that 
we obtained a good fit of the proposed model to the data.  
Furthermore, the theoretical model is compared with the saturated measurement model. 
The theoretical model is clearly the more parsimonious of these two models with a 
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Parsimonious GFI and Parsimonious NFI of 0.77 and 0.73, respectively, compared with 
0.64 and 0.62 for the measurement model.   
The strength of the linearity in relations between constructs and items is shown in Figure 
2 as the factor loadings of each item linked to a construct  (Hair et al., 1995). In all cases, 
the strength of the linearity is relatively strong with all factor loadings being above 0.65 
and with highly significant t-values for all items (the lowest t-value being 3.29). 
 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1, linking the intention to share with the actual knowledge sharing behavior, 
is strongly supported (see Figure 2). In line with our predictions, we find that the 
intention to share positively and strongly determines (coefficient: 0.34, p<0.01) 
knowledge sharing behavior. 
- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
We also find that the three antecedents of the intention are significantly positive, albeit to 
varying degrees (Hypotheses 2-4 are supported). The strongest determinant of intentions 
is the subjective norm (coefficient: 0.39, p<0.01), followed by attitude toward knowledge 
sharing (coefficient: 0.17, p<0.01), and the perceived control (coefficient: 0.15, p >0.01).  
The following three hypotheses on knowledge governance mechanisms are also highly 
significant (p < 0.01). The use of reciprocity schemes (coefficient: 0.44) and the 
extensive employment of communication mechanisms (coefficient: 0.39) are positively 
related to subjective norm and perceived control, respectively, confirming Hypotheses 6 
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and 7. However, contrary to expectations, the use of rewards turns out to have a 
significant negative impact on attitude toward knowledge sharing (coefficient: -0.23).  
The correlations among the three governance mechanisms show that the use of 
reciprocity schemes is strongly correlated with the use of both external rewards and 
communication mechanisms. This might indicate that reciprocity schemes are often 
applied together with other knowledge governance mechanisms.  
As a further step in assessing the salience of each of the independent constructs in 
relation to knowledge sharing behavior, we measured the total effect of each construct on 
the knowledge sharing behavior, including both direct effects and indirect effects. Our 
findings, in descending order, were as follows: intention to share (0.39), subjective norm 
(0.17), attitude toward knowledge sharing (0.07), reciprocity schemes (0.07), perceived 
control (0.06), communication mechanisms (0.03), and external rewards (-0.01). Put 
simply, this means that the governance mechanisms that are most important in 
determining the knowledge sharing behavior are reciprocity schemes and to some extent, 
communication mechanisms, while the total effect of external rewards is negligible (and 
negative). 
In addition, we compared the theoretical model with two other competing models – that 
is, the saturated measurement model and a model where all six constructs for individual 
perceptions and knowledge governance mechanisms are directly linked to the intention to 
share. The goodness-of-fit statistics for these three models are shown in Table 3. The 
theoretical model is clearly the most parsimonious model with a Parsimonious GFI and a 
Parsimonious NFI of 0.76 and 0.73, respectively. The comparison of the model with the 
direct links to intention to share and the theoretical model, where the links between the 
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knowledge governance mechanism and individual knowledge sharing are mediated by 
individual perception variables, clearly shows that the theoretical model is superior, as it 
has higher values of Parsimonious GFI and Parsimonious NFI. This is a strong indication 
that the individual perception variables (intention, attitude, subjective norms and 
perceived control) in fact mediate the effect of the knowledge governance mechanism on 
individual knowledge sharing behavior. 
- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The knowledge-based view has recently been criticized for overlooking individual-level 
variation in favor of an overriding emphasis on firm-level capabilities (Felin and 
Hesterly, 2007; Foss, 2007). Our paper is an attempt to respond to that criticism by 
providing and unfolding some individual-level explanans. Theoretically, we build upon 
the TPB, which identifies the antecedents of a human behavior i.e. the considerations that 
guide human behavior. We define an individual’s decision to engage in a specified 
behavior (like sharing knowledge) as being determined by the intention to perform the 
behavior, which in turn is affected by individual attitudes toward knowledge sharing, 
subjective norms and perceived control. The final model provides strong evidence in 
support of the argument that the intention to share knowledge is formed as a combination 
of the social influence (social norms), an individual’s confidence in her ability to perform 
the knowledge sharing (perceived control), and the individual’s own attitude toward 
sharing of knowledge (attitude). 
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The resultant model goes beyond previous efforts by not only unfolding the individual 
behavior and considering its determinants (attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
control) but also by delineating key governance mechanisms that condition the above 
determinants. By using governance mechanisms such as reciprocity schemes and 
communication mechanisms, managers can positively affect the individual perception of 
subjective norms and perceived control, respectively, and thus govern individual 
knowledge sharing behavior. The use of external rewards seems surprisingly enough to 
be counterproductive in creating a positive attitude toward knowledge sharing. This 
implies that we cannot simply pay for knowledge sharing behavior: such behavior can 
only be encouraged and facilitated (Bock et al. 2005: 89). While such a finding might 
simply be a reflection of the specific external rewards in the two organizations, traditional 
theories on motivation (e.g. Vroom, 1964) warn against assuming that a straightforward 
relationship between extrinsic stimuli and individual behavior exists. Frey (1997) points 
out that there might be a negative effect of introducing extrinsic motivation to activities 
that are intrinsic in nature (see also Amabile, 1997). Organ and Konovsky (1989) suggest 
that rewards might inhibit cooperation. Similarly, Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) 
conclude that introducing financial incentives for agents contributing to a socially 
desirable outcome tends to decrease the number of contributions. One explanation for this 
might be that when pecuniary rewards are introduced, an incentive for the individual to 
withhold knowledge for future gains is also introduced (see also Bock et al., 2005). 
Finally, as Osterloh and Frey (2000) suggest, when tacit knowledge is involved and 
multiple-task problems are combined with the problem of ‘free riding’ in teams, intrinsic 
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motivation enables knowledge transfer under conditions in which extrinsic motivation 
(and hence the effect of external rewards) fails.  
The developed and tested model is not only a response to our need to understand the 
desired micro-foundations (Felin and Foss, 2005) but also a reaction to practitioners’ 
needs. The comparison of the final model with alternative models including more direct 
effects of knowledge governance mechanisms on individual knowledge sharing behavior 
provides strong evidence that this relationship is mediated by the intention to share and 
its antecedents. It also shows that managers are able to affect the intention to share by 
using governance mechanisms that influence attitudes toward knowledge sharing, 
subjective norms and perceived control. The development of these governance 
mechanisms is dependent on purposeful action and investment, not least on the part of 
managers with a particular responsibility for knowledge sharing. Management should be 
able to create the right conditions and stimulate the behavior needed for efficient 
knowledge sharing by affecting individuals’ perceptions. More specifically, they can alter 
the reciprocal schemes in such a way that positive subjective norms and social influence 
are promoted. Furthermore, to ensure that individuals feel more confidence in their ability 
to perform knowledge sharing, management should offer various opportunities for 
individuals to engage in knowledge sharing behavior, i.e. employ communication 
mechanisms such as face-to-face communication, meetings, and informal interactions.    
Naturally, our research also has limitations. The empirical focus was limited: we 
examined only two firms, both originating from Denmark (although foreign subsidiaries 
participated in the survey in both cases). Longitudinal research design would have 
allowed us to examine the possibility of a lagged effect of governance mechanisms on 
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antecedents of individual behavior. We also acknowledge the shortcomings of using 
perceptual instruments to measure all variables. Although we have argued for the 
suitability of perceptual data for the studies of individual human behavior,  it would be 
useful in future to combine perceptual data with more objective indicators in order to 
develop more elaborate measures. In relation to the latter, our measure of knowledge 
sharing behavior is also limited as we only capture the extent to which an individual 
gained and used knowledge from her colleagues. A more elaborate measure might also 
include the perception of the extent to which colleagues gained and used knowledge 
coming from that individual. Finally, since we were very focused on taking advantage of 
the insights of the TPB, we overlooked (perhaps intentionally) the fact that there might be 
alternative explanations to knowledge sharing such as organizational culture, social 
interactions, trust, etc. We did so to focus on the individual (micro) level in this paper. 
However, future studies should pay more attention to the movement from micro to 
macro, which in fact, involves a potentially strong interdependence between an 
individual’s action and those of others in the same context, particularly when actions are 
explicitly “strategic” in the sense that actors take into account the actions of other actors 
(Abell et al., 2008). 
However, even with these limitations we found some interesting results that have 
potentially important implications for the governance of knowledge sharing between 
individuals. Our study is also relevant for future research on knowledge sharing in terms 
of the operationalization of the variables offered, the theoretical model and the focus on 
individuals engaged in knowledge sharing. Finally, we illustrated the applicability of the 
TPB for studying individual knowledge sharing behavior and its antecedents.             
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Figure 1. The motivation sequence (Figure 1 in Locke, 1991) 
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Figure 2. Theoretical model 
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Figure 3. Empirical model 
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Table 1. Description of the respondents 
    Danisco Chr.Hansen 
Gender: Male 125 139 
Female 91 112 
Non-response 3 0 
Position: Low 118 80 
Middle 69 84 
Top 30 81 
Non-response 2 6 
Experience: Average 9.48 8.34 
Age: Average 39.52 40.91 
Education: High school or below 43 27 
Bachelor's degree 99 99 
Master's degree 70 88 
Ph.D. 5 37 
Non-response 2 0 
Country: Australia 6   
Belgium 17   
China 13   
Denmark 48 153 
Finland 15   
France   26 
Malaysia 19   
Mexico 20   
New Zealand 9   
Sweden     
the UK 20   
USA 48 59 
Other 4 13 
Total    219 251 
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Table 2. Constructs and items 
Constructs and items Factor loading*
R2-
value 
Construct 
Reliability 
Variance 
extracted by 
construct
Knowledge sharing behavior   0.92 0.86 
To what extent have you…     
… gained knowledge from colleagues in your own department? 0.92 0.84   
… used knowledge from colleagues in your own department? 0.93 0.86   
(Scale from 1 – little or no extent to 5 - very large extent)     
Intention   0.75 0.59 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
Increased value for my department is enough to motivate 
knowledge sharing. 0.79 0.62   
Increased value for me is enough to motivate knowledge sharing 0.75 0.57   
(Scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree)     
Attitude   0.67 0.51 
It is important to keep one’s ideas secret until one can be 
recognized as the source of the idea (reverse coded) 0.65 0.42   
The knowledge one shares reduces the incentives for other people 
to do the work themselves (reverse coded) 0.77 0.60   
(Scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree)     
Subjective norm   0.67 0.50 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?     
Knowledge sharing is valued in my company 0.70 0.50   
Knowledge sharing is valued in my department 0.71 0.51   
(Scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree)     
Perceived control   0.67 0.51 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(Having your department in mind)     
I feel I have the right to make mistakes when I do my job 0.77 0.60   
I do not have difficulties telling others about own mistakes 0.65 0.42   
(Scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree)     
Rewards   0.78 0.64 
To what extent are you currently rewarded for transferring 
knowledge in your company?     
By increments/bonuses 0.82 0.67   
By promotion 0.78 0.60   
(Scale ranging from 1 – little or no extent to 5 – very large extent)     
Reciprocity   0.81 0.59 
To what extent are you currently rewarded for transferring 
knowledge in your company?     
By acknowledgement of my contribution 0.82 0.67   
By a better reputation 0.76 0.57   
By professional and personal development 0.72 0.51   
(Scale ranging from 1 – little or no extent to 5 – very large extent)     
Communication   0.75 0.50 
To what extent do you use the following media when you transfer 
knowledge with other people in your company?     
Face-to-face communication 0.70 0.50   
Meetings 0.66 0.44   
Informal communication (coffee breaks, social events, etc.) 0.75 0.57   
(Scale ranging from 1 – never to 5 – very often)     
* all factor loadings have t-values above 3 and are highly significant at p < 0.001 
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Table 3. Goodness-of-fit statistics for three competing specification of the model 
 
 1 
Measurement model 
 
2 
Direct links: 
Six constructs → 
Intention  → 
Knowledge sharing 
3 
Theoretical model 
Chi-square (d.f.) 163.0 (102 d.f.) 230.2 (116 d.f.) 311.5 (126 d.f.) 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) 0.96 0.95 0.93 
GFI adjusted for d.f. 0.93 0.92 0.91 
Parsimonious GFI  0.64 0.72 0.76 
RMSEA 0.04 0.06 0.05 
NNFI 0.96 0.94 0.91 
Parsimonious NFI 0.62 0.69 0.73 
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